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EXISTENCE, UNIQUENESS AND SOME 
COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR RATIO- AND 
LINDAHL EQUILIBRIA: 





We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl 
equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public good model. 
Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public good model, 
lends itself to a transparent geometric representation. Moreover, it can handle the more 
general concept of the cost-share or ratio equilibrium. Finally, we indicate how it may be ex-
ploited to facilitate comparative static analysis of Lindahl and cost share equilibria. 
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The Lindahl equilibrium represents the traditional solution concept through which a coopera-
tive outcome in a public-good economy is specified. The description and analysis of Lindahl 
equilibria thus has been a standard topic in the theory of public goods for a very long time.  It 
is therefore surprising that no simple existence proof for a Lindahl equilibrium seems to be 
available, even in the textbook case when a single public good is produced by a constant re-
turns to scale technology and there is an arbitrary number of agents. The diagrams that are 
normally used to visualize the existence of a Lindahl solution only apply to the case with two 
agents and cannot be generalized to the case of more agents (see ,e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980, pp. 509-510, Myles, 1995, pp. 272-275, Cornes and Sandler, 1996, pp. 201-205, Thom-
son, 1999, or Hindriks and Myles, 2006, pp. 113-117) . The more rigorous and general exis-
tence proofs, however, are – by, e g., making use of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem – mathe-
matically rather demanding (see ,e.g., Foley, 1967, Milleron, 1972, Roberts, 1974, Kaneko, 
1977, or Mas-Colell and Silvestre, 1989) and quite different from the standard treatment of 
public good theory. Moreover, the problem of uniqueness which is treated extensively for 
other types of economic equilibria has not attracted much attention in the context of the Lin-
dahl solution until now. 
     In order to close this gap we describe in the present paper how the existence and the 
uniqueness issues can be dealt with by an elementary method that, on the one hand, is related 
to the analysis of aggregative games as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2007) and, on the 
other hand, is inspired by the graphical devices already presented in the seminal papers by 
Bowen (1943) and Samuelson (1955). Exploiting this approach it is also possible to include 
proportional cost-share or ratio equilibria (see Kaneko, 1977, or Silvestre, 2003, for a com-
prehensive discussion) − a natural generalization of Lindahl equilibria for the case of non-
constant marginal costs for producing the public good  −  from the outset without incurring 
any essential complication. After presenting the general theoretical framework in Section 2 
and discussing the existence and uniqueness issue in Section 3, we show in Section 4 how this 
method expedites comparative static analysis of Lindahl and ratio equilibria. Section 5 con-
cludes with some remarks on how Bowen’s (1943) and Samuelson’s (1955) venerable contri-
butions can be interpreted from the viewpoint of the present paper. 
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2. The Framework 
In an economy consisting of n agents,  i x  denotes agent i´s private consumption and G is pub-
lic good supply. Agent i is endowed with an amount  i y  of the private good (his “income”) 
which can be transformed into units of the public good. The aggregate budget constraint is 
 








+ = ∑  
 







=∑  is the total income of all agents. 
The cost function is assumed to have  (0) 0 C = , to be twice differentiable for  0 G >  and to be 
left-hand differentiable at  0 G =  with  '(0) 0 C >  as its derivative. For the first and second de-
rivatives we assume  '( ) 0 CG>  for all  0 G >  and  ''( ) 0 CG≥  for all  0 G ≥ , so that we have 
non-decreasing marginal costs.  
        The preferences of agent i are given by the utility function  ( , ) ii uxG that is defined for all 
0 i x ≥  and all  0. G ≥  Each utility function is assumed to be continuous on its domain and to 
be twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave on  0 i x >  and  0. G >  Fur-
thermore, we suppose throughout the whole analysis that the public good is at least weakly 
non-inferior for every agent i. By  ( ) i Gp  we now denote agent i´s Marshallian pseudo-demand 
function for the public good when agent i is endowed with income  i y  and has to bear the in-
dividual cost share  i p  in the total cost of the public good. Given any  i p , the value of  ( ) ii Gp 
is obtained from maximizing utility  ( ( ), ) ii i uy p C GG −  for all  0 G > , where for the sake of 
convenience we allow for  1 i p >  such that at the outset  i p  need not be a true cost share. If the 
cost function  () CG is linear,  i p  corresponds to the personalized public-good price as in the 
standard Lindahl model, and in this case  ( ) ii Gp is the conventional Marshallian demand 
function of agent i.  
       Define  { } :s u p : ( ) 0 ( 0 ,) ii i i pp G p => ∈ ∞  for each agent i. By weak non-inferiority of the 
public good and strict convexity of the indifference curves each demand function  ( ) ii Gp then 
is strictly decreasing in the cost share  i p  on (0, ) i p , which for the general case is shown in    3
Appendix A1. For the constant marginal cost case, this is a standard result in basic microeco-
nomics. Furthermore,  lim ( ) 0
ii
ii pp Gp
→ =  and 
0 lim ( )
i
ii p Gp
→ = ∞. (The first lim-property is obvious 
from continuity, the second follows by an indirect proof: Assume that  ( ) ii Gp were bounded 
from above by some finite  i G . Then consider the indifference curve passing through (, ) ii yG. 
By our assumptions, this has a finite non-zero slope there. Choose some  i GG > %  and observe 
that 
0 lim( ( ))
i
ii i p yp C G y
→ −= % . Consequently, for some sufficiently low cost-share parameter  i p % , 
agent  i’s possibility curve defined by ( ( ), ) ii yp C G G − %  intersects the indifference curve 
through  (, ) ii yG. Given  i p %  public-good demand of agent i then would be higher than  i G  
which is a contradiction.) 
       These considerations imply that the inverse function of  ( ) ii Gp, denoted by  ( ) i p G , is de-
fined for all G > 0. It is strictly decreasing in G, never becomes zero and takes on any value in 
(0, ). i p  
 
3. Existence and Uniqueness of Proportional Cost-Share Equilibria 
In the present public good economy a Lindahlian cost-share (or ratio) equilibrium is defined 
by an n-tuple of non-negative personalized cost shares  1 ( ,..., )
LL
n p p , an n-tuple of individual 
consumption levels  1 ( ,..., )
LL
n x x  and a supply level of the public good  0
L G >  such that  
 
(i) 
L G  maximizes utility  (( ) , )
L
ii i uy p C GG −  of agent i among all G  if agent i is con-
fronted with the personalized public good price
L















= ∑ , which means that the allocation  1 ( ,..., , )
LL L
n x xG is feasible according to (1). 
. 
      It directly follows from condition (iii), that in a ratio equilibrium  1
L
i p ≤  must hold for 
each agent i such that true cost shares are obtained. With the help of the inverse pseudo- 
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demand functions  ( ) i p G  existence and uniqueness of such a proportional cost-share equilib-
rium can now be established in a very simple way using the public good level G as a parame-
ter. This procedure thus parallels the "aggregative games approach" by Cornes and Hartley 
(2007), which in the context of public goods has until now only been used to describe non-
cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria. In order to make this method also applicable for the 
analysis of cooperative Lindahl equilibria we introduce a new function:  
 










This aggregate price function  ( ) PG corresponds to total willingness to pay for the public 
good when public-good supply is G  and, in addition, all agents demand the amount G  as 
cost-share takers. For the case of quasi-linear utility function such an addition of marginal 
willingness to pay has already been an element of Bowen’s analysis (1943) but was – as 
Samuelson’s (1955) graphical device – not used to characterize Lindahl equilibria until now. 









It follows from strict monotonicity and continuity of all functions  ( ) i p G  that  () PG is strictly 
decreasing and continuous on (0, ). ∞  The following result therefore holds: 
 
Proposition 1: If  1 P >  there exists a unique Lindahlian cost-share equilibrium with  0
L G >  
and  0
L
i p >  for all  1,..., in = . 
 
Proof: Given our assumptions we have  ()1 PG >  for small values of G  but  ()1 PG <  for high 
values of G . The mean value theorem then implies that there exists some  ˆ 0 G >  such that 
ˆ ()1 PG =  as depicted in Figure 1.  
   5
 
Let individual cost-shares now be defined by  ˆ ˆ :( ) 0 ii pp G = >  for each agent i.  Then condi-
tions (i) and (iii) are obviously fulfilled given  1 ˆˆ ( ,..., ) n p p  and  ˆ. G  If private consumption is 
ˆ ˆˆ :( ) ii i x yp C G =−  for each agent  1,..., in = , condition (ii) holds by definition. Therefore, 
1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , ) n x xG  is a ratio equilibrium with personalized cost shares  1 ˆˆ ( ,..., ) n p p . This proves exis-
tence. For the uniqueness part let some cost-share equilibrium with public-good supply 
L G  be 
given. Then, condition (iii) implies  ˆ () 1 ( )
L PG PG ==  since from condition (i) we have 
()
LL
ii p Gp =  for each agent i. Because  () PG is strictly decreasing in G  this implies  ˆ L GG = . 
We then obtain  ˆ ˆ () ( )
LL
ii i i p pG pG p == =  and  ˆ ˆˆ
LL L
iii ii i x yp Gyp G x = −= − =  for all agents 
1,..., in =  which shows that any ratio equilibrium must coincide with the alloca-
tion 1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , ) n x xG .                                                                                                               QED. 
 
In the standard textbook case with indifference curves that are tangential to the G-axis  P = ∞ 
is obtained such that, according to Proposition 1, existence and uniqueness of a Lindahl equi-
librium is ensured for any cost function. Note that the construction underlying the proof of 
Proposition 1 ensures that a cost-share equilibrium is Pareto-optimal since the conditions that 





Public good supply 
Aggregate prices 
ˆ G   0 
1
Figure 1   6
4. Some Comparative Statics  
We now analyze the effects on public-good supply and individual welfare when the composi-
tion of the agents and thus the aggregate price function P(G) is changed and the cost function 
() CG is given. In particular we consider the case in which one of the original individuals, say 
agent k, is substituted by another type of agent with either higher income  k y %  or a utility func-
tion ( , ) kk uxG %  that exhibits a stronger preference for the public good. Precisely, the change of 
preferences is described by the assumption that agent k’s marginal willingness to pay for the 
public good, i.e. his marginal rate of substitution  ( , ) kk x G π  between the public of the private 
good, is for any ( , ) k x G  higher under  k u %  than under the original utility function  k u . In both 
cases the value of the new pseudo-demand for the public good is increased everywhere, i.e. 
() () kk kk Gp Gp > %  is obtained for any cost-share level  0 k p >  when we assume strong normal-
ity of the public good in the case of an income increase. Such a change of demand curves is 
obvious if the underlying technology exhibits constant returns to scale. For the general case of 
a convex cost function this result is shown in Appendix A2. Then for the inverse demand 
function we have  ( ) ( ) kk p Gp G > %  for every  0. G >  Consequently, 
1




P G pG pG pG P G
≠=
=+ > = ∑∑ % % .  
         In the other scenario, an additional agent  1 n+  with income  1 n y +  and the utility function 
1(,) ni ux G +  joins the economy whereas the original agents  1,..., in =  remain the same. If 








P G pG pG P G
+
==
=>= ∑∑ %  for any  0. G >  Then we directly obtain the fol-
lowing basic comparative statics result for cost-share equilibria. (For a more intricate analysis 
of the comparative statics of Lindahl equilibria see also Sertel, 1994, Sertel and Yilmiz, 1996, 
and Thomson, 1999.) 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that one agent in the original economy gets a higher income or that he 
is substituted by another agent with a higher preference for the public good or that a new 
agent enters the economy. In the Lindahl equilibrium then public good supply and the utility 
levels of all unaltered agents are increased. 
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Proof: Let 
L G %  be public-good supply in the (new) cost-share equilibrium after one of the 
changes considered in Proposition 2 has been made. If  ( ) PG %  denotes the after-change aggre-
gate price function 
L G %  fulfils  ( ) 1
L PG = % %  by Proposition 1. Since  ( ) ( ) PG PG > %  for all  0 G >  
and ( ) PG and  ( ) PG %  both are strictly decreasing 
LL GG > % is obtained. As the inverse pseudo-
demand functions  ( ) i p G  are strictly decreasing in G  the Lindahlian cost share 
L
i p %  of any 
agent  i who is unaffected by the change therefore becomes smaller, i.e. 
() ()
LL L L
ii i i p pG pG p =<= % % . Confronted with the lower cost share 
L
i p %  each of these invariant 
agents will then clearly attain higher utility after the change.                                            QED. 
 
Note that in the case where the agent with the changing income has quasi-linear preferences 
of the form  ( , ) ( ) kk k k uxG x vG = +  the only change in the Lindahl solution is an increase of 
private consumption of agent k which is equal to the income increase. Thus, the result of 
Proposition 2 requires the assumption of strong normality when an increase of income is con-
sidered. 
 
5. A Historical Remark 
A diagram that looks like our Figure 1 was already used by Bowen (1943, p. 31) to character-
ize the “ideal output” of a public good. In his paper, however, no reference to Lindahl (1919) 
was made. There was no clear distinction between the marginal and the average cost function, 
and instead of the inverse pseudo-demand curve  ( ) PG as in our equation (1), Bowen (1943, 
p. 30) constructed a “curve of total marginal substitution … expressing the amount of money 
the members of the group would be willing to give up in order to obtain successive units of 
education (the public good, W.B, R.C. and W.P).” He only made some short remarks that this 
function should somehow be related to individual demand functions.  
       Samuelson (1955, pp. 353-354) took up Bowen’s diagram in order to compare his own 
graphical exposition of public-good theory with earlier approaches. He referred to Lindahl in 
this context (without having “access to this important work”, see Footnote 8 on p. 354 of 
Samuelson, 1954), and clarified that the use of the marginal cost function is required to de-
termine a Pareto optimal solution. But he also remained quite opaque concerning the nature of 
the ( ) PG-curve, saying that it should come about by aggregating marginal rates of substitu-
tion  along indifference curves of the different agents involved. According to Samuelson 
(1955, p. 353) “these schedules look like demand curves”, not stating explicitly that he actu- 
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ally meant Hicksian demand curves. By not using Marshallian pseudo-demand functions of 
cost-share as in Lindahl’s two-agent-model, Samuelson missed Lindahl’s true concerns and 
made things more complicated. Hicksian and Marshallian demand curves only coincide in 
special situations, e.g. if utility functions are quasi-linear of the form  ( , ) ( ) ii i k uxG x vG =+ . 
Only in this case it makes sense to refer to an addition of mrs-curves or demand curves with-
out further qualification as it is often done in textbooks. (For some non-technical discussion of 
the Bowen-Samuelson graphical device see Musgrave, 1959, pp. 57-59, Danziger, 1976, and 
Batina and Ihori, 2005, pp. 13-14.) 
     In the end, Samuelson (1955, p. 354)) gave a rather negative assessment of both Bowen’s 
and Lindahl’s graphical devices stating that “there is something circular and unsatisfactory 
about both the Lindahl and the Bowen construction.” In contrast, the purpose of this paper is 
to show that Bowen’s idea if correctly interpreted can be very helpful to establish central fea-




A1 The Effects of a Changing Cost Share on Public Good Demand 
Let the cost function  ( ) CG be given as in the main text and consider some agent i. We want 
to show that a higher cost share implies a lower public-good demand of agent i. For an indi-
rect proof assume that we have  ii p p > %  but, simultaneously,  ( ) ( ) ii ii Gp Gp ≥ % . For private-
good demand before and after the cost share increase we then obtain  ( ) ( ) ii ii x px p < % . Let 
(,) ii x G π  denote agent i’s marginal rate of substitution between the public and the private 
good at any ( , ) i x G  which by weak non-inferiority does not increase when public good supply 
grows and private consumption falls. Observing the marginal conditions resulting from agent 
i’s utility maximization, we then get 
 
(3)                         '( ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) '( ( )) i i i ii ii i ii ii i i pCGp xp Gp xp Gp p CGp π π =≤= %% % % . 
 
This contradicts our assumptions as from  ''( ) 0 CG≥  we have  '( ( )) '( ( )) ii ii CGp CGp ≥ % . There-
fore, each agent i’s pseudo-demand function  ( ) ii Gp for the public good is strictly decreasing 
in the cost-share parameter  i p .  
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A2 The Effects of Changing Income and Preferences on Public-Good Demand 
Let some cost share  k p  of agent k be given. Assume, for an indirect proof, that we have 
() () kk kk Gp Gp ≤ %  either after an increase of agent k’s income or by an intensification of his 
preferences for the public good as described in the main text. For agent k’s private consump-
tion before and after the change we then would obtain  ( ) ( ) kk kk x px p ≥ %  with a strong inequal-
ity in the case of an increasing income. Analogous to the analysis in Appendix A1 this would 
imply  
 
(4)                            '( ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) '( ( )) kk k k k k k k kk p CGp xp Gp xp Gp p CGp ππ =>= %% % . 
 
Here, the strong inequality follows from strong normality of the public good in the case of an 
income change and, in the case of a preference change, from the definition of stronger prefer-
ences for the public good and weak normality. This inequality, however, contradicts the as-
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